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Separable abilities in early development?
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Abstract
In this article, I explore whether there might be two separable components to person-perception and
interpersonal engagement in infancy: the ability to apprehend other people's attitudes on the one hand, and
the ability to perceive actions on the other. In support of this approach, I summarize some evidence from a
recent study of autistic adolescents' judgments of attitudes and actions manifest in moving point-light displays
of people. I highlight the far-reaching cognitive as well associal-developmental implications of early
interpersonal-affective engagement. I conclude by speculating that certain abnormalities that would stem from
autistic individuals' impaired ability to perceive and engage with people's attitudes may be somewhat mitigated
by their relative ability to perceive the actions of others.
In this theoretical article, I discuss how a prove misleading when characterizing the
normal infant's capacity to perceive and re- nature of psychological functioning in early
spond to other people's emotional attitudes childhood. On the other hand, it does not
plays a vital role in early social and cogni- get us very far to pay lip-service to the insep-
tive development. I illustrate how it is in the arability of affect and cognition in infancy,
domain of developmental psychopathol- if we fail to provide some alternative and
ogy, specifically through the study of early more appropriate concepts to partition out
childhood autism, that we may find evi- the separable components of infant psy-
dence pointing to the special quality and de- chology. Such concepts should enable us to
velopmental significance of interpersonal- see how in due course, thinking, feeling,
affective perception and relatedness. and so on emerge in their familiar adult
One of the difficulties in approaching guises.
these matters, is clarifying terms such as In the past, I have dwelt upon the very
"emotional attitudes" or "cognitive devel- young child's increasingly sophisticated
opment." Part of the problem is that the awareness of "persons" as a major social-
meanings of these words may change radi- cognitive developmental achievement that
cally when applied to different stages in de- yields the older child's concepts of "bodies"
velopment. For example, the contrasts be- and "minds" (e.g., Hobson 1989; 1990c;
tween affect and cognition may be useful 1991). In this article, I pursue a related but
when applied to adult psychology, yet may rather different thesis, that in shaping an
account of early cognitive as well as social
I am indebted to my colleagues Derek Moore and Tony development, we should adopt a frame of
Lee for their collaboration in the empirical study I have reference couched in terms of an infant's
described in this paper, and to Mike Tomasello for ability to perceive, respond to, and identify
lively discussions on a number of topics, not least the with the subjectively experienced and emo-
significance of predication. . "* ,,.., , „ ,
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Peter Hobson, Tavistock Clinic, 120 Belsize Lane, take my text from Lev Vygotsky (1962),
London, NW3 5BA, UK. who when reflecting on the nature of think-
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ing wrote that "every idea contains a trans- rating evidence for such interpersonal coor-
muted affective attitude toward the bit of dination can be gleaned from observations
reality to which it refers" (p. 8). This state- of the mutual patterning of adult-infant in-
ment not only captures something about teractions in more natural circumstances,
what it means to think (and, incidentally, although as in the case of neonatal imita-
enables us to escape from the dead-end of tion, young infants' attentiveness and re-
methodological solipsism as espoused by sponsiveness to the movements and actions
Fodor, 1980), but it also points us toward of other people have been subject to alter-
an account of how thinking develops native interpretations (e.g., Brazelton, Kos-
through the human capacity to have and to lowski, & Main, 1974; Frye, Rawling,
share attitudes toward the world. Moore, & Myers, 1983; Kaye, 1982; Stern,
To begin with, I review a highly selective 1977; Sylvester-Bradley, 1985; Trevarthen,
series of observations on normal infancy. I 1979). The dramatic effects on 3-month-
draw a distinction between two facets of olds of "perturbations" in the mutuality of
this development which are often conflated: caregiver-infant exchanges induced, for ex-
the child's abilities to perceive, respond to, ample, by adults adopting a "still face"
imitate, and identify with other people's ac- (Cohn & Tronick, 1983) or by experiment-
tions on the one hand, and the child's ability ers introducing feedback delays in TV-
to perceive, respond to, imitate, and iden- linked mother-infant transactions (Murray
tify with other people's attitudes on the & Trevarthen, 1985), strongly suggest that
other. I suggest that there are separable young infants do perceive and react to
components to these aspects of interper- adults' behavior toward themselves. More-
sonal perception and engagement, and I over in experimental studies of young in-
highlight the significance of the "attitude" fants' perceptual abilities, 3- to 5-month-
component for our account of early cogni- olds have demonstrated attentiveness to
tive development. I also consider how the point-light displays of a walking person rep-
study of early childhood autism may inform resented only as moving dots of light
our perspective on these matters. attached to the person's body and limbs, in
preference to other randomly moving point-
r\ XT 11? i ™ i • * lights or upside-down point-light people
On Normal Early Development , n . ., , n -_.,*; „ ~ °. ..^
v (e.g., Bertenthal, Proffitt & Cutting, 1984;
There is evidence that from very early in Fox & McDaniel, 1982). This suggests that
life, an infant perceives the presence and be- quite young infants are able to pick up eco-
havior of other people as significant and logically significant information from the
meaningful. Consider an infant's respon- biomechanical motion of the bodies of
siveness to another person's actions. One other people.
oft-cited phenomenon in this respect is that Note that in such studies, there is often
of neonatal imitation (e.g., Meltzoff, 1990; ambiguity over the kinds of person-related
Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). For example, meaning that may be salient and discrimina-
Meltzoff and Moore (1983) confronted ble to young infants. To return to neonatal
newborns with someone demonstrating imitation, for example, infants less than 2
mouth opening and tongue protrusion, and days-old have been presented with posed
arranged for an observer who was blind to emotional expressions as well as actions
the modeled behavior to judge the infants' (Field, 1985; Field et al., 1983; Field,
videotaped responses. There were signifi- Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982). The
cantly more infant mouth openings in re- infants were reported to show widened eyes
sponses to the mouth display than to the and mouth opening in response to a model's
tongue display, and more tongue protru- surprised face, lip widening to a happy face,
sions to the tongue display (see Meltzoff & and tightened mouth with protruding lips
Moore, 1989, for a study with infants who accompanied by a furrowed brow to a sad
also matched head movements). Corrobo- expression. Is this mimicking of "behav-Apprehending attitudes and actions 173
ior," or does it involve the perception of garding observations on infants 9-12
feelings? Or again, in the aforementioned months-of-age, for here there is the widely
observations of natural and perturbed recognized contrast between protoimpera-
adult-infant interactions, what importance tive and protodeclarative communicative
should be assigned to an infant's perception functions (Bates, 1979; Bates, Benigni,
of and responsiveness to an adult's emo- Bretherton, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1979;
tional expressions? For that matter, how Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975; Camai-
much in the form and timing of behavior is oni, 1992). Protoimperatives are commu-
to count as "emotional"? Here it is relevant nicative acts such as requesting, which are
that infants have been found to respond intended to induce someone else to do
emotionally not only to disembodied vocal something; protodeclarative are acts such
expressions of feeling (Sagi & Hoffman, as indicating or showing things, intended to
1976; Simner, 1971), but also to another share experiences with (and/or engage the
person's whole-body expressions. Haviland attitudes of) someone else. Even here, how-
andLelwica (1987) asked the mothers of 10- ever, where protodeclarative communica-
week-old infants to enact a range of af fee- tion is often characterized as a matter of the
tive states in their facial and vocal expres- infant engaging someone else's "attention,"
sions during face-to-face exchanges with theoretical work on precursors to such in-
their babies, and the infants reacted to each tersubjective engagement has been rather
of the presentations with affective states of piecemeal. I shall return to this matter
their own. These reactions were manifest shortly, but I emphasize how the range of
not only in the infants' facial and other new accomplishments that emerge late in
bodily gestures, but also in patterns of gaze the first year is made up of propensities and
that were not presented by the mothers. So abilities that might be considered more or
too, in more contrived experiments on so- less heavily weighted in their "action" and
cial perception, infants 5-7 months-of-age "attitude" components. The list includes the
have been reported to demonstrate selective infant's capacity to follow the eye gaze or
attention to emotional information that is point of another person, to request actions
invariant across vocal and visual presen- and to respond to simple verbal requests by
tations of given affective expressions others, to indicate or show objects to others
(Walker, 1982), as well as to discriminate (often looking to the other person's eyes, to
between dynamic face-voice expressions check whether he or she is attending), to ini-
shown on videotape and among more static, tiate as well as accept invitations to games
photographed facial expressions (Caron, such as peek-a-boo, to shake the head to ex-
Caron, & Myers, 1982; La Barbera, Izard, press refusal, to imitate conventional ges-
Vietze.&Parisi, 1976; Young-Browne, Ro- tures (for example, hugging) and actions
senfeld, & Horowitz, 1977). We are led to with objects, to utter greetings ("Hi!") and
reflect on what is essentially "emotional" in namelike words, and to pretend to carry out
such discriminative abilities and to consider adult activities such as telephoning or
the relation between infants' capacities for mopping the floor (Bretherton, McNew, &
"action recognition" and "affect recogni- Beeghly-Smith, 1981; Trevarthen & Hub-
tion." ley, 1978). This is also the period during
My purpose in citing these observations which the infant shows "social referencing"
and experiments is to highlight an issue that in seeking out a caregiver's affective expres-
is sometimes glossed over or neglected in ac- sion, relating this to the current situation,
counts of early development: whether an in- and reacting accordingly in feeling as well as
fant's capacity to perceive and react to other action (Campos & Stenberg, 1981; Fein-
people's actions is partly separable from the man, 1982; Feinman & Lewis, 1983; Klin-
infant's capacity to perceive and react to nert, Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda,
other people's attitudes. This kind of dis- 1983).
tinction has received more attention re- This catalogue of new communicative174 R. p. Hobson
and cognitive abilities is far from homoge- of the attitudes and goal-directed actions
neous. By requesting things and initiating that are manifest in others' expressions and
games, the infant reveals a capacity to relate behavior. The infant also reacts to and acts
in various ways to another person's inten- upon such attitudes and actions, for exam-
tions and/or actions; by imitating conven- pie by assuming corresponding attitudes (as
tional gestures and other behavior, the in- in sharing) or by imitating or thwarting oth-
fant demonstrates an ability to adopt and ers' actions. This implies a motivational and
execute the actions of another person. Very emotional investment in the various forms
recently, a highly ingenious visual dishabit- of interpersonal engagement,
uation experiment by Gergely, Nadasdy, Yet once again, the attitude-versus-
Csibra, and Biro (in press) yielded confir- action distinction points to a contrast be-
matory evidence that 12-month-olds can tween two potentially dissociable forms of
identify an agent (in this case, a computer- social engagement. On the one hand, there
generated circle behaving in humanlike is the mode of intersubjective engagement
ways) and interpret the agent's actions in re- in which the infant registers and has an
lation to its goal. What of the infant's ways emotionally patterned reaction to another
of relating to people's attitudes? By show- person's (subjectively experienced) atti-
ing objects and monitoring the other per- tudes. Here the paradigmatic case is an in-
son's bodily expressive responses, the infant fant's response to another's expressions of
manifests some level of awareness that affect. For truly intersubjective contact, the
"showing" may be necessary and potentially infant needs to maintain a focus on the
sufficient to achieve a special kind of inter- source of the attitudes—that is, the other
personal coordination and quite possibly, a person—and must not merely use the affect
sense of sharing with another person, /fit is expressed to indicate the potential desirabil-
the case that, at the end of the first year, an ity, danger, or whatever of the objects to
infant is obeying and refusing, or adopting which that person is relating. A second
adultlike sounds or gestures to express mode of engagement may involve the in-
greetings and farewells (provided, that is, fant's perceiving, reacting to, and some-
the infants are indeed expressing greetings times appropriating a person's actions,
and farewells, even in restricted contexts), without a sense of intersubjective connect-
then this seems to imply that the infant is edness to the other person. After all, a hu-
complying with, opposing, and identifying man being can imitate nonhuman animals
with the perceived attitudes of others, as well as certain machines, without any in-
When in circumstances of social referenc- terindividual sharing or coordination of
ing, the infant adopts someone else's evalu- mental states.
ation of an object or event—for example, I intend to highlight the implications of
avoiding a toy toward which an adult has this perspective for our account of the early
shown disgust (Hornik, Risenhoover, & development of symbolic thought and lan-
Gunnar, 1987; Walden & Ogan, 1988)—the guage. I also provide some justification for
infant shows how he or she has a propensity the approach by citing some relevant evi-
to assume the other person's attitude to- dence from a recent experimental investiga-
ward a particular target situated in a shared tion with autistic individuals,
world.
In each of these cases, it is a moot point . „ . . . o. . „,...
, .. ,, . c ., ,,. . - „. An Experimental Study With whether the infant s "level of awareness in- A .. .. T ,. ., . . . . .. , Autistic Individuals eludes a representation (or even more
strongly, an understanding or concept) of I summarize selected results from a study by
the other person's attitude, intention, or colleagues and myself (Moore, Hobson, &
other mental state. What appears to be nee- Lee, 1994), which suggest that in autism we
essary and perhaps sufficient, is that the in- may find a relative dissociation between the
fant registers and interprets the directedness ability to perceive people's actions on theApprehending attitudes and actions 175
one hand, and the ability to perceive (and two occasions. The group difference was
engage with) people's feelings and emotion- not caused by a failure to respond by autis-
related attitudes on the other. tic individuals. On each and every item, all
Groups of 13 autistic and nonautistic re- participants of each group made reference
tarded participants were pairwise matched to meaningful content in what was de-
for chronological age and verbal mental age picted, in nearly every case either to emo-
as assessed by the British Picture Vocabu- tion or to actions and movements of the
lary Scale (Dunn, Dunn, &Whetton, 1982). arms and legs of the point-light person.
In fact, we also included a mental age- Typical responses for the autistic group
matched group of normal children, but I were "walking and sitting down on a chair"
shall not consider them further except to for sad, "standing up and moving back-
state that their performance was closely ward" for scared, and "walking and jogging
similar to that of the nonautistic control and shaking his arms" for angry. Unlike
group. control participants, they attended to (be-
The technique was to present brief video- came psychologically engaged with) and re-
tape sequences of a moving person visible marked on the actions, but not the atti-
only as points of light emanating from re- tudes, of the point-light person,
flective patches attached to the person's The succeeding task was designed to ex-
limbs and body, a technique pioneered by plore the accuracy with which participants
Johansson (1973). There was an introduc- were able to name actions and emotional or
tory procedure in which subjects were emotion-related psychological states in
shown a fully visible person who was subse- point-light displays of a person, when they
quently seen walking in "point-light" form were asked specific questions in these re-
in darkness, and then reilluminated. All spects. In this case, the separate 5-s displays
subjects were able to grasp how a person involved 10 nonemotional actions (lifting,
was being represented. The task involved chopping, hopping, kicking, jumping,
the presentation of separate 5-s sequences pushing, digging, sitting, climbing, and
of the point-light person enacting gestures running) and 10 gestures and actions that
of surprise, sadness, fear, anger, and happi- had emotionally expressive content (the five
ness, respectively. For example, the "sad" basic emotions employed in the first experi-
person walked forward slowly, sighed, sat ment, and the states of itchiness, boredom,
down on a chair limply, lifted his hands tiredness, cold, and hurt). The nonemo-
slowly, and put his head in his hands. Parti- tional actions were presented in one video-
cipants were told, "You're going to see some tape, and the emotion-related states were
bits of film of a person moving. I want you presented in another, with a counterbal-
to tell me about this person. Tell me what's anced order to the presentation of the vid-
happening." We took care to phrase eotapes. For the "actions" videotape, the
prompts in terms of "what was happening," experimenter said, "I want you to tell me
and made no reference to feelings nor ac- what the person is doing"; for the "atti-
tions. Our prediction was that autistic indi- tudes" videotape, he said, "I want you to tell
viduals would differ from control subjects me what the person is feeling"
in remarking on the actions, rather than the At the outset, we had intended to exclude
emotional attitudes, of the person depicted, from the analysis of results those items that
Our predictions were borne out by the re- yielded ceiling or floor effects. This applied
suits. Whereas 10 out of 13 autistic individ- to the actions of kicking and jumping, and
uals failed to refer to emotional states the emotions of surprise and boredom, re-
(whether correctly or incorrectly) on all five spectively. The results on the remaining
presentations of the basic emotions, only items were that the nonemotion and emo-
one of the nonautistic mentally retarded tion conditions were equally difficult for
participants performed in this way, and the the nonautistic retarded subjects. More-
majority referred to emotions on at least over, there was not a significant difference176 R. P. Hobson
between autistic and nonautistic subjects on cance of biologically based interpersonal
the nonemotion (actions) task. In contrast coordination, and especially affective coor-
to this result, the autistic subjects achieved dination, for a child's growing understand-
significantly lower scores on the task in- ing that people have their own subjective
volving judgements of emotion-related states of mind (e.g., Hobson, 1990c, 1990b,
states (following the finding of a significant 1991, 1993b). On the other hand, it has re-
group-by-condition interaction on ANOVA, mained an open question how far a young
an independent / test with a Bonferroni child might come to understand persons-
correction yielded t = 4.0, df = 24, p < with-minds on the basis of capacities to per-
.005). The two groups differed significantly ceive and respond to actions, rather than
in their abilities to name the point-light dis- bodily expressed subjective states, manifest
plays depicting happiness, fear, sadness, in the behavior of others. This distinction is
itchiness, and anger, so that the results re- neither clear nor absolute, insofar as the
fleeted far-reaching impairments in autistic perception and understanding of actions
subjects' ability to recognize attitudes, not may encompass more than a grasp of goal-
merely selective deficits in naming so-called directedness that one could attribute to ma-
"cognitive" emotions dependent upon be- chines, and might extend to notions about
liefs (Baron-Cohen, Spitz, & Cross, 1993). a person's subjectively grounded intentions
In summary, the study yielded evidence behind such actions (e.g., Premack, 1991).
for a remarkable specificity in autistic indi- Nevertheless, as the difference between pro-
viduals' lesser attentiveness to and impaired todeclarative and protoimperative commu-
discrimination of emotion-related attitudes nication illustrates, this may be a distinction
in the gestures of people, as represented in worth pursuing (Camaioni, 1992; Gomez,
whole-body, point-light videotape displays. Sarria, & Tamarit, 1993; Hobson, 1994).
The autistic subjects could recognize certain There are a number of theoretical works
person-related meanings even in such "ab- that have a bearing upon this issue. For ex-
stract" (but ecologically valid) biomechani- ample, Trevarthen (1982) contrasts the in-
cal representations, but these meanings had terpersonal and practical aims of infants,
to do with actions rather than subjective but he tends to class together the infant's
states. The findings are relevant for ac- "primary motives for transmission of feel-
counts of autistic individuals' impairments ings and purposes between human subjects"
in understanding as well as perceiving "per- (Trevarthen, 1982, p. 85). In an analysis of
sons" as beings with their own subjective the Language Acquisition Support System,
orientations to the world (e.g., Hobson, Bruner (1983) stresses the role of the con-
1993). Moreover, autistic children's relative ventional format, "a routinized and re-
failure to attend to and identify with such peated interaction in which an adult and
attitudes is likely to have far-reaching con- child do things to and with each other" (p.
sequences for their capacity to adopt the 132, Bruner's italics). In fact, such "doing"
attitudes of other people, and thereby to includes achieving joint attention as well as
distance themselves from their own "ego- joint action, and Bruner is concerned with
centric" attitudes to the world. "referring" as much as he is with "request-
ing." Bruner claims that the intent to refer,
T .. .. „ ~ ... , as well as the recognition of that intent in
Impl,ca..ons for Cogn, .ve and unlearned (Bruner, 1983, pp. 122-
Languagc Development
123) ft ^
I have been focusing on whether there are reading a person's intent or goal-directed-
separate "action" and "attitude" compo- ness is one thing, and understanding the
nents to person perception and responsiv- particular goal that is intended, namely the
ity. If so, this fact is likely to shed light on goal of referring or communicating, is an-
the origins of interpersonal understanding other.
(or in modern parlance, "theory of mind"). Consider once again how an infant may
In previous work, I have stressed the signifl- be able to perceive actions with goals, forApprehending attitudes and actions 177
example, reaching for something with the and other involves much more than the kind
goal of grasping the object, or bringing of ability present in 3-month-olds who reg-
food to one's mouth with the goal of eating ister when they are "out of tune" with some-
it. It is logically and perhaps psychologi- one else. There is something quite different
cally possible to perceive the goal of an ac- about perceiving and reacting to others' at-
tion without conceiving of an agent with titudes to oneself, perceiving and reacting
that goal, or a fortiori, without conceiving to others' attitudes to the world, and con-
of an agent who has the intention to achieve ceiving and representing other persons (and
the goal. An individual also might perceive oneself) as beings who have subjective atti-
and be inclined to mimic and/or imitate the tudes. My thesis is that the following are es-
goal-directed actions of others, and by sential prerequisites for the transition from
some admixture of first-person experience the early forms of one-to-one primary inter-
of the infant's own goal-directed actions subjectivity to the acquisition of an initial
and his/her perception and appropriation understanding of the nature of self vis-a-vis
of the actions of others, come to some more other persons around 18 months-of-age.
explicit understanding of what it means for First, there is the 9-month-old's capacity to
actions to be goal-directed (see Russell, perceive the directedness of other people's
1994, for thoughtful discussion of agency in attitudes, as manifest in social referencing
early mental development). On the other and protodeclarative communication. Sec-
hand, certain actions and gestures have a ond, there is the business of identifying with
very special kind of goal, namely the goal other people's attitudes, assuming their sub-
of communicating with someone else. Such jective orientations, whether covertly or
communicating may take many forms, of overtly in imitation. (Here the claim is that
course-making and breaking contact as in perceiving the directedness of actions, as
greetings and farewells, referring to things, well as imitating actions, may draw on some
informing and persuading, teasing, repudi- similar psychological mechanisms, but that
ating, and so on, and it includes the need to perceiving and assuming attitudes involves
convey that one intends to communicate something more.) I take it that these abili-
(Grice, 1957). In previous writings, I have ties and propensities are givens of human
argued that to communicate with someone psychology. Now that the infant is in a posi-
or to refer for someone entails that the tion to relate to given, visually specified ob-
someone is recognized as a person with jects and events according to how the infant
whom psychological sharing is possible reacts to the situation and according to an-
(Hobson, 1993c). This recognition entails other person's attitude to the situation, the
that an infant registers (not necessarily con- infant is in a position to notice that attitudes
ceptualizes) other people's emotional states toward things are different from the things
and reacts to expressions of feeling with co- themselves—provided two further condi-
ordinated (not necessarily concordant) feel- tions are met. The first condition is that the
ings of his or her own. In other words, an infant must register the difference between
understanding of the goal to communicate his/her own attitudes and attitudes per-
requires both an understanding of what it ceived in and sometimes taken from others,
means to intend to do something and an un- The second condition is that the infant
derstanding of what it means to align or co- needs to adopt an attitude to his/her own
ordinate one's subjective orientation with attitudes. As Mead (1934) originally sug-
that of another person. The latter form of gested, and as Hobson (1990a) and Toma-
understanding could not arise (so the argu- sello (1993) have recently discussed, this lat-
ment goes) except through experience of ter accomplishment may depend on the
person-to-person intersubjective linkage infant identifying with the other's attitude
and differentiation, experience that comes to him/herself.
by virtue of innate capacities for interper- The developmental implications of these
sonal-affective exchange. processes and events, which occupy the pe-
Conceptual differentiation between self riod from approximately 9-18 months or178 R. P. Hobson
so, are far-reaching for cognitive and lin- knowledge Alan Leslie's (in press) theoreti-
guistic as well as social development. I have cal approach, which is closely related to my
tried to trace these implications in other own thesis and is similarly well-placed to ac-
writings (especially Hobson, 1993c), and commodate the evidence from autism de-
here I shall merely signpost some of the ar- scribed earlier. Leslie attributes an infant's
eas in which the child's world has been radi- knowledge of agency to three distinct "pro-
cally altered by his/her ability not only to cessing subsystems" concerned with me-
assume, but also to become aware of assum- chanical agency, actional agency, and atti-
ing, the attitudes of others toward a shared tudinal agency. It is this latter distinction
world. In the domain of interpersonal un- between two aspects of the intentional
derstanding ("theory of mind"), the child properties of agents with which I have been
conceptualizes how the child is a "self concerned. The former involves agents act-
among other selves, so that he or she can ing in pursuit of goals (as represented), and
knowingly accommodate to the attitudes, the latter concerns attitudes to thetruth of
preferences, and mental states of others in propositions about states of affairs (in Les-
sophisticated role taking and acts of empa- lie's terminology; I do not think that invok-
thy (Hoffman, 1984; Kagan, 1982). In the ing the notion of "truth" is appropriate for
domain of creative symbolic play, the characterizing the nature of mental state
child's insight into the distinction between understanding in 1- and 2-year-olds, but let
"thought" (attitude) and "thing" means that that be). Leslie also anchored pretend play
he or she can intentionally transfer attitudes and informative communication in an in-
from one object or situation to another, and fant's grasp of attitudinal rather than ac-
choose to imbue play materials with novel tional agency.
meanings (Leslie, 1987; Hobson, 1990c). In The critical point about the perception of
the domain of language, the child's new- attitudinal agency (Leslie's terms), or about
found grasp of the ways in which words are infants' perception of and engagement with
anchored to the particular aspect of mean- attitudes in increasingly sophisticated and
ing-for-persons that a person is intending to cognitively elaborated forms of intersubjec-
express, is constitutive of the ability to com- tive exchange (my terms), is that here we
prehend and make predicative utterances, discern the bases for children's concepts of
The very possibility of articulating com- what it is to be a person with subjectively ex-
ments about a referred-to object or event perienced mental states and psychological
arises when the child comes to appreciate orientations to the world. The ability to per-
the manifold thoughts that can be enter- ceive and imitate actions, even goal-directed
tained and communicated (by and to imag- actions, might itself lead infants to register
ined persons in different psychological ori- correspondences between other people and
entations) in relation to given, shared themselves, and might even anchor an un-
situations. It is no coincidence that the ref- derstanding of certain linguistic expressions
erence-to-predication shift in language (see Tomasello & Barton, in press). It is,
(e.g., Bates, 1993) occurs in conjunction however, very difficult to see how this alone
with these other changes around 18 months could yield an understanding of others as
of age. subjects of experience who communicate
Even if these sweeping claims about the with each other (for arguments against rea-
basis for the cognitive revolution at approx- soning by analogy from the self's own expe-
imately 18 months are justified, we must riences, for example, see Hobson, 1991).
still establish how appropriate it is to give Without such understanding of subjective
such prominence to infant's abilities to per- mental life, and without a grasp of how the
ceive, and propensities to identify with, the world can fall under different descriptions
attitudes of other people. We seem to have for different people (and for oneself^ cre-
left behind the parallel account of infants ative symbolic functioning and language
perceiving and imitating others' actions. Be- would be severely compromised,
fore addressing this issue, I need to ac- This returns us to the nature and originsApprehending attitudes and actions 179
of thought and to the quote from Vygotsky suggesting that specific impairments in af-
(1962) with which I began this article. To fectively patterned intersubjective engage-
put it bluntly, we shall never understand ment may lie at the source of these chil-
how thought is always "about" something, dren's relative lack of "joint-attention,"
nor how thought originates in human devel- protodeclarative communication, and sym-
opment, unless we appreciate how thoughts bolic play, and may even account for their
about things are abstracted from attitudes specific profile of abnormalities in language
toward things-as-experienced. Or to ap- and thinking (Hobson, 1993c). I shall not
proach the matter differently, our account pursue the details of that account here, even
of a child's understanding of propositional though I believe it helps justify what might
attitudes—what it means to think or believe have seemed unlicensed speculation in some
or wish that such-and-such is the case- parts of this paper. Instead, I turn the argu-
needs to be an account of how the child ment around, and reflect on the striking evi-
comes to recognize that because of the na- dence for certain abilities in the autistic in-
ture of people's attitudes (or what it means dividuals we have been testing. Not only
to construe things according to meanings- could our autistic subjects perceive mean-
for-persons), the world and imagined possi- ingful point-light Gestalten presented on
ble worlds can be characterized in various videotape, but they attended to and named
ways that may be thought about, believed, the actions of the people portrayed. This
wished for, and so on. If this suggestion is finding may reveal an area of social ability
correct, then it follows that the develop- in autism that has considerable practical as
ment of specifically human forms of higher well as theoretical significance. We are ac-
cognitive functioning depends on develop- customed to highlighting the marked and
ments in interpersonal relations and inter- characteristic disabilities of people with au-
personal understanding in the earliest tism, but many such people also acquire im-
phases of life. pressive (if patchy) cognitive and linguistic
abilities. We need to understand how they
achieve what they do, as well as to explain
Conclusions the social and intenectual difficulties they
I have drawn attention to a potentially sig- face. Autistic children's abilities to perceive
nificant theoretical distinction between a actions might provide a route to under-
young child's ability to perceive and re- standing something about other people and
spond to another person's bodily expressed even people's minds, and may assist their
attitudes and the ability to perceive and re- struggle (as it often seems to be) to acquire
spond to another person's actions. Al- language and to engage in reflective
though I have not attempted to map out the thought, especially when the impediments
developmental implications that follow to truly intersubjective contact are not too
from drawing this distinction, I hope that severe. Moreover, as colleagues and myself
the pointers I provided in discussing the are currently investigating, the perplexing
roots of protodeclarative gestures and refer- mixture of imitative abilities and disabilities
ence and of symbolic functioning and Ian- in autistic children (reviewed in Hobson,
guage, are sufficient to indicate the poten- 1993c), for example in their relatively better
tial importance of an infant's perception of performance in copying goal-directed actions
and engagement with other people's atti- than in mimicking meaningless body move-
tudes. ments or bodily expressions of affect, may be
Our experiment with autistic individuals explicable in terms of their relative ability to
may serve to illustrate the potential value of perceive actions vis-a-vis bodily expressed at-
studies in developmental psychopathology titudes. Because interpersonal engagement
for separating out potentially dissociable has a strongly motivational component, we
facets of psychological functioning. In- may also be led to see why autistic children
deed, the evidence that emerged is in keep- often fail to react to or imitate certain of the
ing with a theoretical approach to autism expressive gestures and actions of other peo-180 R. P. Hobson
pie, whereas they appear to notice and some-
times to adopt other kinds of action and even
communicative expression. Even more im-
portant, we may begin to discern the reasons
for their lack of interest and investment in, as
well as limited appreciation of, the emotional
and cognitive dimensions of human cultural
life (Hobson, 1993c; Tomasello, Kruger, &
Ratner, 1993).
This line of reasoning may not be correct
in all its particulars, but it exemplifies how
theoretical as well as empirical study in the
field of development psychopathology may
lead to new perspectives on both normal
and abnormal psychological functioning—
in the present case, on specific facets of in-
terpersonal perception and affective en-
gagement that may prove to have great sig-
nificance for early cognitive as well as social
development.
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